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Comments
LEGAL RAMIFICATIONS OF THE UNCONTROLLED
RETURN OF SPACE OBJECTS TO EARTH
REBECCA J. MARTIN
T HE SPACE station Skylab was launched into orbit by the
United States in May of 1973.1 Efforts to maintain the orbit
of Skylab failed, and on July 11, 1979, the remnants of Skylab
plummeted to earth in the outback region of Australia. Fortu-
nately, no damage of consequence was reported,' but the incident
sparked a wave of concern over the potential danger of the un-
controlled return of space objects to earth.' The fall of Skylab
also highlighted the possible international legal issues which may
arise in the event of the uncontrolled return to earth of a space
object. The major legal aspects may be divided into four general
areas: (1) liability for personal and property injury; (2) financial
responsibility for search and recovery operations; (3) treatment
of the wreckage; and (4) methods of asserting a claim for damages.
This comment, after tracing the history of the international agree-
ments concerning the regulation of space activities, will discuss
these issues in terms of present international space law.
I. HISTORY OF REGULATIONS CONCERNING SPACE ACTMTIES
The existence of complex international legal problems inherent
in the uncontrolled return to earth of space debris was recognized
from the inception of the "Space Age."' The United Nations Gen-
eral Assembly acknowledged the need for regulation of space activi-
ties in a 1958 resolution calling for a study of "the nature of legal
1 TIME, July 16, 1979, at 21.
2NEWSWEEK, July 23, 1979, at 31.
3 Id.
4 U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT, July 23, 1979, at 5.
5The "Space Age" began in 1957 with the launching of the Russian satellite
Sputnik I. Debates on the peaceful uses of outer space were begun in the United
Nations General Assembly around the same time.
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problems which may arise in the carrying out of programmes to
explore outer space."' The project was assigned to the Ad Hoc
Committee on Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, a committee created
by the same resolution.' Following the report of the Ad Hoc
Committee in 1959,8 the United Nations General Assembly estab-
lished the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space (the
Committee) as a permanent body.'
Between 1959 and 1961 no progress was made in the regula-
tion of any outer space activities because of the refusal of Russia
and other Eastern European members of the Committee to par-
ticipate in the proceedings. ° At the end of 1961 the Committee
began to meet on a regular basis, and at the Second Session in
1962 the Legal Subcommittee was formed.' The members agreed
that the Subcommittee would give priority to the creation of
principles governing the exploration and use of outer space; from
these principles various legal issues, such as liability, would be
defined through debate. "
6 G.A. Res. 1348, 13 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 18) 6, U.N. Doe. A/4090
(1958).
7Id.
8 G.A. Res. 1472, 14 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 16) 5, U.N. Do. A/4354
(1959). The report of the Ad Hoc Committee divided the problems encountered
in outer space activities into two groups: legal problems susceptible of priority
treatment, and other problems.
8 Id. The Committee originally consisted of representatives of 24 countries.
Today 37 nations participate in the work of the Committee, including the
United States, the Soviet Union, France, the German Democratic Republic, the
Federal Republic of Germany, Japan and the United Kingdom.
10 Foster, The Convention on International Liability for Damage Caused by
Space Objects, 10 CANADIAN Y.B. INT'L. L. 137 (1972). The U.S.S.R., Poland
and Czechoslovakia refused to participate because of the composition of the
Committee and its method of procedure. The United Arab Republic and India
would not participate without the Soviet countries. Id.
11 Report of the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, 17 U.N.
GAOR, I Annexes (Agenda Item 27) 2, U.N. Doe. A/5171 (1962). Two sub-
committees were established at the same time, the Legal Subcommittee and the
Scientific and Technical Subcommittee. All members of the Committee on the
Peaceful Uses of Outer Space are represented on its two subcommittees.
12 Id. See Hosenball, Space Law, Liability, and Insurance Risks, 12 FoRuM
143 (1976). The Legal Subcommittee is to follow a procedure of consensus of
the members to reach agreement, the same procedure followed by the Com-
mittee. No votes are ever taken on any matter before the Committee or its sub-
committees. A single member can prevent an item from passing or being in-
cluded in the reports. Conflict must be resolved by unanimous agreement, or
by the dissenting member noting an objection but allowing an item to pass and
be included in a report.
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The activity of the Legal Subcommittee led to the first major
international treaty governing the use of space, the Treaty on
Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration
and Use of Outer Space, Including the Moon and Other Celestial
Bodies (the Outer Space Treaty of 1967)." The treaty was the
culmination of the original report of the Ad Hoc Committee
in 1959, and later proposals of the Legal Subcommittee, which
were submitted by the Committee to the General Assembly
and adopted as resolutions. The most important of these reso-
lutions was that entitled Declaration of Legal Principles Gov-
erning the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer
Space, which was adopted by the General Assembly in 1963 and
was the principal basis for the Outer Space Treaty."'
Even before the Outer Space Treaty was signed, the United
Nations General Assembly requested further elaboration of specific
principles in regard to the international responsibility and lia-
bility of states with respect to their space activities. Although the
Committee had acknowledged that the activity of all nations in
outer space is governed by the applicable general principles of
international law, the General Assembly encouraged the Commit-
tee "to continue with a sense of urgency its work on an agreement
[regarding] assistance to and return of astronauts and space ve-
hicles," as well as its, work on a draft treaty on liability."0 Priority
was given to work on the Agreement on the Rescue of Astronauts,
the Return of Astronauts-, and the Return of Objects launched into
Outer Space (the Rescue Agreement), which became effective in
13 18 U.S.T. 2410, T.I.A.S. No. 6437 [hereinafter referred to as the Outer
Space Treaty].
14 G.A. Res. 2222, 21 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 16) 13, U.N. Doc. A/6316
(1967).
" Report of the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, 16 U.N.
GAOR, Committees (1st) 245 (Agenda Item 21), U.N. Doc. A/C1/SR.1210
(1961). Two propositions generally accepted by the members of the Committee
were that principles of international law, including the charter of the United
Nations, applied to outer space and celestial bodies, and neither outer space nor
celestial bodies are subject to claims of sovereignty or national appropriation
but are available for exploration and use by all states in conformity to inter-
national law. The United Nations formally adopted these two recognized prin-
ciples in 1961. U.N. Res. 1721 A, 16 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 17) 7, U.N.
Doc. A/5100 (1962).
'
6 G.A. Res. 2260, 22 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 16) 11, U.N. Do. A/6716
(1968).
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1968." In 1970 the General Assembly formally expressed its regret
that the Committee had not completed a draft treaty on liability.'
Finally, in June of 1971, the Legal Subcommittee reached con-
sensus on a draft of the Convention on International Liability for
Damage Caused by Space Objects (the Liability Convention).
The draft was adopted by the General Assembly on November 29,
1971, and took effect as a treaty in 1972. Turning to the problem
of the identification and cataloging of all objects launched into
space, the Legal Subcommittee completed a final draft of the Con-
vention of Registration of Objects Launched into Outer Space
which was recommended for signature by the General Assembly
in 1974.1 It became effective on September 15, 1976.2
Thus, the work of the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer
Space and its Legal Subcommittee over the past two decades re-
sulted in four treaties which refined the governing principles of
international law in the area of space and related activities: (1)
the Outer Space Treaty of 1967; (2) the Rescue Agreement of
1968; (3) the 1972 Liability Convention; and (4) the Registra-
tion Convention of 1976. The scope of these treaties is far from
comprehensive; it would be impossible to envision and provide
for all the variables encountered in space exploration. The resolu-
tion of legal problems occasioned by the uncontrolled return to
earth of any space object, however, should in the first instance be
governed by the provisions of these four treaties.
17 Agreement on the Rescue of Astronauts, the Return of Astronauts, and the
Return of Objects Launched into Outer Space (1968), 19 U.S.T. 7570, T.I.A.S.
No. 6599 [hereinafter referred to as the Rescue Agreement].
"8 G.A. Res. 2733 B, 25 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 28) 20, U.N. Doc. A/8028
(1970).
10Report of the First Committee on Item 33, 26 U.N. GAOR, Annexes
(Agenda Items 33 and 92) 2-8, U.N. Doc. A/2528 (1971).
2' The Convention on International Liability for Damage Caused by Space
Objects (1972), 24 U.S.T. 2389, T.I.A.S. No. 7762 [hereinafter referred to as
the Liability Convention].
21 The subject of the registration of space objects had first been addressed
by the Ad Hoc Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space. See 14 U.N.
GAOR, 1 Annexes (Agenda Item 25), U.N. Doc. A/4144 (1959). A subsequent
resolution called for a registration of any objects launched into orbit or beyond,
U.N. Res. 1721 B, 16 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 17) 7, U.N. Doc. A/5100
(1962). After 1961, however, the matter of registration was largely ignored until
the completion of the Liability Convention in 1972.
22 Convention on the Registration of Objects Launched into Outer Space
(1976), 28 U.S.T. 695, T.I.A.S. No. 8480.
COMMENTS
II. COMPENSATION FOR DAMAGE TO PERSONS OR PROPERTY
In the event of the crash of a space object to earth the most im-
portant legal issue would be the determination of liability for any
damage to persons or property. To receive compensation under
the Liability Convention the "damage" caused must fall within
the scope of that term as used in the Convention. Similarly, the
instrument which causes the damage must be identified as a space
object. The party responsible must be identified, and the standards
of compensation and liability must be determined. The general
principle of liability for space activities, first set forth in paragraph
eight of the Declaration of Legal Principles (Declaration),' is
reiterated by Article VII of the Outer Space Treaty, which states:
Each State Party to the Treaty that launches or procures the
launching of an object into outer space, including the moon and
other celestial bodies, and each State Party from whose territory
or facility an object is launched, is internationally liable for dam-
age to another State Party to the Treaty or its natural or juridical
persons by such object or its component parts on Earth, in air
space, or in outer space, including the moon and other celestial
bodies."
A. The Standard of Liability-Absolute Liability
The Liability Convention of 1972 is essentially an elaboration
of the provisions of the Declaration. The statement of general
principles, however, was altered upon incorporation into the draft
for the 1972 Convention.' The major alteration was the substitu-
tion of "absolutely liable" for "internationally liable" concerning
the responsibility of a state party for damage caused by space
objects. This change resulted from problems of interpretation that
arose during the consideration of Article VII of the Outer Space
Treaty." The delegate from India argued that "internationally"
would be acceptable only if it meant "absolutely." ' This argu-
-G.A. Res. 1962, 18 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 14) 15, U.N. Doc. A/5514
(1963).
24 Outer Space Treaty, supra note 13, at art. VII.
2' Liability Convention, supra note 20, at art. II: "A launching state shall
be absolutely liable to pay compensation for damage caused by its space object
on the surface of the earth or to an aircraft in flight." Id.
I Dembling & Arons, The Evolution of the Outer Space Treaty, 33 J. Am
L. & COM. 419 (1967).
27 Report of the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, 21 U.N.
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mert was not answered, however,' apparently because the dele-
gates believed the concept of absolute liability was still being re-
fined in detailed draft treaties and would later be included in a
liability treaty."
As expected, the Liability Convention did subsequently use the
phrase "absolutely liable."' No further definition of the meaning
of the phrase is given. As the treaty provides for a very limited
exception to liability, however, it is clear that the drafters intended
that a claimant should not be required to prove fault or negligence
on the part of the responsible state or states. Thus the standard
of liability is strict liability."'
Several arguments for using strict liability as the basic standard
of liability in international space law were advanced prior to and
during the final drafting of the Liability Convention.' First, the
difficulty of proving fault or negligence, considering the complex
GAOR, 2 Annexes (Agenda Items 30, 89, and 90) 18, U.N. Doc. A/6431
(1966).
28 21 U.N. GAOR, Committees (1st) 435 (Agenda Item 91), U.N. Doc.
A/C1/SR.1493 (1966).
29 Dembling & Arons, supra note 26, at 439.
,' A standard of liability based on proof of fault or negligence is provided
in the Liability Convention for the instance when the damage occurs "elsewhere
than on the surface of the earth." Liability Convention, supra note 20, at arts.
III, IV(1)(b). This provision allows for damage to another object in space, or
to persons or property on board that object.
3" The standard of liability that is established is referred to as strict liability
in the United States. This concept of absolute liability is not limited to American
jurisprudence, but is recognized in Europe and the Soviet countries as well.
It was not unusual, therefore, that the members of the Legal Subcommittee agreed
on the desirability of the principle almost without discussion. Mazaroff, Exonera-
tions from Liability for Damage Caused by Space Activities, 54 CORNELL L.
REv. 71 (1968). In every country that recognizes the doctrine of strict liability
differences exist as to what type of activity the doctrine applies, and what cir-
cumstances allow exoneration from the application of the doctrine. For example,
strict liability in the U.S.S.R. is imposed for any damage caused by activities
which involve increased danger. Exoneration is allowed in the instances of
irresistible force and intentional wrongful action or gross negligence on the
part of the injured party. Id.
The United States follows a less rigid standard, however, and applies the
doctrine only to activities that are deemed to reach the level of "ultrahazardous"
in nature. The Restatement of Torts suggests a somewhat broadened application
and indicates that the doctrine should be applied to any "abnormally dangerous
activity." Exoneration is usually allowed in the case of an unforeseeable opera-
tion of a force of nature, or the intentional reckless or negligent conduct of a
third party. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 520 (Tent. Draft No. 10,
1964).
3 N. MArrE, AEROSPACE LAW 159 (1977).
COMMENTS
and technical nature of the evidence, was noted.' Second, the
possibility that the evidence necessary to prove fault may involve
classified information which the responsible state would refuse to
divulge was also suggested as support for the strict liability
standard." In addition, most commentators classified space ac-
tivity as ultrahazardous in nature and felt that this classification
dictated the application of the strict liability standard.' Finally,
precedent for the use of strict liability in international treaties had
been established by several prior international agreements.' For
example, the 1952 Rome Convention on Damage Caused by
Foreign Aircraft to Third Parties on the Surface merely requires
the injured party to establish the requisite causal connection to
obtain relief.' A limited exception to liability was provided for
those cases in which the negligence or intentional wrongful act of
the claimant is involved.'
The exclusion from liability under the terms of the Liability
Convention is similarly limited. Article VI provides:
[E]xoneration from absolute liability shall be granted to the ex-
tent that a launching State establishes that the damage has re-
sulted either wholly or partially from gross negligence or from
an act or omission with intent to cause damage on the part of a
claimant State or of natural or juridical persons it represents."'
Whether this would allow for exoneration of the entire claim is
not stipulated. The author of Aerospace Law argues that the
more correct and just "application of the concept of contributory
negligence would lead to exoneration of the launching state only
3Id.
3Id.
3Mazaroff, supra note 31. "Haley, Cooper, Beresford, Taubenfeld, McDougal
and Jenks consider present space activities ultrahazardous and maintain that a
policy of strict liability should or will be applied by the international com-
munity in a multilateral agreement." Id. at 80.
"Nanda, Liability for Space Activities, 41 U. CoLo. L. REv. 509 (1969).
The major international conventions which had previously adopted the principle
of strict liability are: the 1952 Rome Convention on Damage Caused by Foreign
Aircraft to Third Parties on the Surface, the 1960 Paris Convention on Third
Party Liability in the Field of Nuclear Energy, the 1962 Brussels Convention
on the Liability of Operators of Nuclear Ships, and the 1963 Vienna Convention
on Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage. Id. at 516.
i Id. at 517.
38d.
"Liability Convention, supra note 20, at art. VI.
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with respect to the part of the total claim which represents the
damage of the person whose acts contributed to the damages.""
Permitting the contributory negligence of one victim to preclude
compensation to an entire claimant state and its other individual
victims would be in opposition to the intention of the drafters of
the Liability Convention to permit very limited exoneration.
B. Damage
The strict liability standard eliminates the necessity of proving
fault or negligence to establish a claim, but in order to qualify for
compensation the damage must be within the scope of the mean-
ing of that term as defined by Article I of the Liability Convention:
"The term 'damage' means loss of life, personal injury or other
impairment of health; or loss of or damage to property of States
or of persons, natural or juridical, or property of international
intergovernmental organizations; . . ."' Commentators have noted
that this definition is very broad: "it is difficult to say precisely what
kind of damage is covered: loss of profit, interest, sentimental value,
pain and suffering?"'' These types of damages are unknown in the
Soviet and Eastern European legal systems." For example, in the
U.S.S.R. compensation is determined in the context of institutional
costs (hospitalization, etc.) rather than personal loss to the indi-
vidual." Damages for such personal losses, however, would prob-
ably be present in any claim presented by the United States. '
There is also the possibility that a party might suffer indirect
damages.' It was proposed that these be included in the defini-
tion of "damages."" The United States opposed this proposal and
"ON. MATTE, supra note 32, at 160.
41 Liability Convention, supra note 20, at art. I.
42 N. MATTE, supra note 32, at 157.
1' Hosenball, supra note 12.
"Id. at 150.
'Id. at 151.
IIndirect damages may be viewed as the remote consequences of an action,
those related in some manner to the action but not a direct result of it. An
example given by Hosenball in his article is that of a tourist who suffered a heart
attack in the evacuation of the Eiffel Tower, after it was struck by a large
piece of satellite. The tourist's heart attack is possibly the indirect result of the
crash of the satellite. Id. at 146-47, 151.
"U.N. Doc. A/AC.105/C.2/L.26. India proposed to include in a liability
treaty the stipulation that "damage may be instant or delayed, direct or indirect."
See U.N. GAOR, 2 Annexes (Agenda Item 32) 2, U.N. Doc. A/6804, appendix
COMMENTS
specifically stated in 1971 that the Liability Convention did not
cover indirect damages.' A final answer to this question must await
the determination of a specific claim.
C. Standard and Form of Compensation
Article XII of the Liability Convention also deals with compen-
sation for damages in terms of the amount for which a responsible
state shall be liable. "The compensation ... shall be determined
in accordance with international law and the principles of justice
and equity, in order to provide such reparation in respect of the
damage as will restore [the damaged person or property] to the
condition which would have existed if the damage had not oc-
curred."' Unfortunately, this provision does not clarify which
types of damages will be compensated, nor does it provide a sub-
stantial formula by which to measure damages.
One of the more troublesome problems confronted by the Legal
Subcommittee was the standard of compensation to be adopted.
The members of the Legal Subcommittee were concerned with
the determination of the applicable law to be used to establish
the standard."0 Proposals for the applicable law included that of
the state where the damage occurs,"' that of the state liable for
the damage,"1 and the law as agreed upon by the claimant and
respondent for determining the standard of compensation.'
The difficulty in negotiating the standard of compensation was
I, Proposals Relating to the Liability for Damage Caused by the Launching
of Objects into Outer Space (1967).
48 Hosenball, supra note 12, at 151.
' Liability Convention, supra note 20, at art. XII.
'See 21 U.N. GAOR, Committee (1st) (Agenda Item 33), U.N. Docs.
A/C.1/PV.1819 through A/C.I/PV.1826 (1971) (general debate on liability).
5"Several member states supported the adoption of the principle of lex loci
delicti commissi, including Brazil. 21 U.N. GAOR, Committees (1st) (Agenda
Items 33 and 92) 3, U.N. Doc. A/C.1/PV.1821 (1971); Canada, id. at 6, and
France. 21 U.N. GAOR, Committees (lst) (Agenda Items 33 and 92) 8, U.N.
Doc. A/C.1/PV.1823 (1971).
52 Hungarian Draft Proposal, 22 U.N. GAOR, 2 Annexes (Agenda Item 32)
27, U.N. Doc. A/6804, appendix 11 (1967).
'Report of the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, 23 U.N.
GAOR (Agenda Item 24, Annex II), U.N. Doc. A/7285 (1968). The proposal
that the law accepted by the claimant and the respondent would be the applicable
law for determining the standard of liability was agreed upon by the Subcommittee
in discussion but that premise was never formally included in the text of the
Liability Convention.
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due in part to the differences in the tort and claims laws of the
various legal systems of the countries represented in the Com-
mittee." For example, the Russian system of compensation is much
more limited than that of the United States.' If the applicable
law were that of the launching state, a United States claimant in-
jured by a Russian satellite component would be limited to the
Soviet measure of damages." For differing reasons the United
States, the Soviet Union and others would not accept the applicable
law of the state where the damage occurred."7 The final agreement
upon the payment of compensation "in accordance with interna-
tional law and the principles of justice and equity""8 leaves open,
as stated above, the question of the precise damages that will be
compensated.
The text of Article XII does allow for speculation upon this
question, however. Because no uniform view exists on what con-
stitutes each aspect of international law, the respective views of
the parties involved in any claim proceeding will play an important
role." As stated in the proceedings of the Legal Subcommittee,
"reference to the principles of justice and equity ... would enable
the claims commission to take into account the legal system in
force in the State in which the damage occurred.' '"" The concept
of full compensation included in the preamble to the Convention, 1
along with the restitution provision of Article XII, indicates that
the determination of any claim should be victim-oriented.
The form of compensation is explicitly determined by Article
XIII of the Liability Convention. Payment is to be made in the
currency of the claimant state, or, upon request of that state, in
54 Hosenball, supra note 12, at 150.
" Mazaroff, supra note 31. The Russian system of compensation is compre-
hensive in coverage for institutional costs such as hospitalization and medical
expenses, but does not extend to individualized losses such as personal suffering.
"Hosenball, supra note 12, at 150.
57 Id.
" Liability Convention, supra note 20, at art. XII.
' 
9N. MATTE, supra note 32, at 169.
O°U.N. Doc. A/AC.105/C.2/SR.164 (1971) as quoted in N. MATrE, supra
note 32, at 169.
61 The preamble to the Liability Convention states in part: "Recognizing the
need to elaborate effective international rules and procedures concerning liability
for damage caused by space objects and to insure, in particular, the prompt
payment under the terms of this Convention of a full and equitable measure of
compensation to victims of such damage." 24 U.S.T. 2389.
COMMENTS
the currency of the state from which compensation is due." The
parties may agree on an alternate form of compensation."
D. The Party Responsible
The determination of the party responsible for the damage must
be made before compensation can be awarded to the victim. The
party responsible must be held liable under the terms of the gov-
erning international law. Complications arose out of the provisions
of the 1967 Outer Space Treaty, which established the state
liable as "[e]ach State Party to the Treaty that launches or pro-
cures the launching of an object into outer space, . . . and each
State Party from whose territory or facility an object is launched.""
A definition of "outer space" is not provided. ' The demarcation
line between airspace and outer space has never been established."
It is not stated, therefore, whether space objects, or parts thereof,
which never reach any point that might be considered outer space
are to be included within the above provision.
The drafters of the Liability Convention attempted to avoid
the above complications by eliminating the use of the phrase "outer
space." The necessity for establishing the line for outer space in
terms of where the damage occurs is eliminated by referring to
damage that occurs "on the surface of the earth or to an aircraft
in flight""7 and that which occurs "elsewhere than on the surface
of the earth."" The party responsible is the "launching state,"
not a state which "launches an object into outer space,""0 as first
delineated in the Outer Space Treaty. Following the general guide-
6 Liability Convention, supra note 20, at art. XIII.
"Id.
4Outer Space Treaty, supra note 13, at art. VIII.
65Id.
6The problem of delineating airspace from outer space has been the sub-
ject of much debate within the Committee as the members have attempted to
establish a definition of outer space. Apparently the difficulty in identifying
sufficient scientific or technical criteria upon which a precise and lasting defini-
tion could be based has hampered the adoption of a generally recognized
definition of outer space. See Report of the Committee on the Peaceful Uses
of Outer Space, 23 U.N. GAOR 135 (Agenda Item 24), U.N. Doc. A/7285
(1968).
"Liability Convention, supra note 20, at art. II.
6s Id. art III.
Id.
7 0Outer Space Treaty, supra note 13, at art. VII.
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lines of the Outer Space Treaty, however, a launching state is
any state which launches, procures the launching of, or supplies
the territory or facility for the launching of a space object." As
there is no mention of "outer space," the problem of defining the
phrase directly is avoided. Its meaning, however, is implicit in
the phrase "space object."
The importance of determining what constitutes a space object
is paramount, as the Convention explicitly covers only damage
caused by space objects. Yet the text of the Liability Convention
merely states, "the term 'space object' includes component parts
of a space object as well as its launch vehicle and parts thereof." '
The absence of a definition is due to the acceptance by the Legal
Subcommittee of the suggestion that "space object" had a reason-
ably understood and clear meaning."' The Hungarian draft conven-
tion defined "space object" as any device "designed for movement
in outer space and sustained there otherwise than by the reaction
of air."" The requirement for a design adapted to movement in
outer space appears to be the criterion common to the drafts sub-
mitted to the Legal Subcommittee which included a definition of
space objects."' If this is to be the "clear meaning" accepted by
the Legal Subcommittee, then a generally accepted definition of
outer space should be recognized by that body. Otherwise, it is
questionable whether objects designed for use not in space, but
on other celestial bodies, are encompassed within the term "space
object."' Considering the problem further, it is not clear when
space objects may lose their status as such; the classification as a
space object may be lost with the loss of ability to move in space
if the object is adapted to another use.
One author has suggested that "persons and property on board
a space object are not encompassed by the term 'space object.' ""
7' Liability Convention, supra note 20, at art. I.
721d.
73 Foster, supra note 10, at 145.
74 U.N. Doe. A/AC.105/C.2/L.10 (1967) as quoted in Foster, supra note
10, at 145 n.30. This was apparently the interpretation given to the meaning of
"space object" by the member states that submitted a draft proposal con-
taining a definition of that term.
7- Foster, supra note 10, at 145.
76 Id. at 146-47.
77Id. at 158. "This conclusion is supported by the terminology of Article
I(d) and Articles II, III and IV of the Liability Convention particularly since
COMMENTS
If the persons or property become detached from the space object,
any damage they subsequently caused would not give rise to lia-
bility under the Convention."' This reasoning is not universally
accepted. The author of Aerospace Law asserts that the definition
of space object supports the conclusion that damage caused by
anything associated with it, as well as that damage caused by the
object itself, will be covered by the Convention."
The wording of the Liability Convention also indicates that it
is necessary for an object to be launched in order for it to be con-
sidered a space object."° Permanent moon stations, transported
and assembled on the moon, may not be within this category.
Space shuttles, such as the United States Enterprise, designed for
takeoff in the manner of conventional aircraft, also lack the ele-
ment of having been "launched."
The existence of the type of space shuttle referred to poses a
further problem: the distinction between "aircraft" and "space
objects." Definitions of "aircraft" usually refer to a ffight instru-
mentality that utilizes aerodynamic lift for operation.81 The pro-
posed design for future space shuttles indicates that liftoff and re-
turn to earth will be accomplished by aerodynamic lift." Objects
intended for use in outer space, but so designed as to rely on
aerodynamic lift while passing through the atmosphere are not
excluded from definitions of "aircraft" currently in use." In cer-
tain cases, therefore, objects may be classified as both "aircraft"
and "space objects."
The distinction may be one of academic interest only until the
question of liability for damage arises. The standard of liability
to which a responsible state will be held may vary with the classi-
fication." Space objects are subject to the provisions of the Lia-
the latter two articles speak of damages 'to a space object . . . or to persons or
property on board such space object."' Id. at 158 n.69.
7 8Id. at 158-59.
79 N. MATrE, supra note 32, at 157.
80 Liability Convention, supra note 20, at arts. I, 1I, III.
" See International Civil Aviation Organization, Convention on International
Civil Aviation, Annex 2: International Standards, Rules of the Air 9 (6th ed.
Sept. 1970).
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bility Convention,' while the settlement of a dispute involving
damage caused by an aircraft may be subject to the Convention
on Damage Caused by Foreign Aircraft to Third Parties on the
Surface." The latter treaty has limitations on absolute liability not
available in the Liability Convention.
Several methods to determine a definite classification for instru-
mentalities of such a dual nature are possible. They might be
classified according to the place where the damage occurs, the
mode of operation at that time, or according to their designated
primary purpose." The latter classification is the most advanta-
geous; the status of the object would not vary according to circum-
stances.
As stated above, liability under the Convention rests with the
launching state. Specifically defined by the Convention, the "launch-
ing state" is any state "which launches or procures the launching
of a space object"8 or "from whose territory or facility a space
object is launched."'8 The term "launching" is meant to include
attempted launchings." The definition recognizes that more than
one state may be involved in a project, and many states may co-
operate to facilitate one launching. A state may be held liable
even though it takes only a passive role in the launching."
Through Article V, joint and several liability for any damage
caused by a space object is invoked "whenever two or more states
jointly launch a space object."" The difficulty encountered is that
the use of the phrase "launching states" was omitted by the drafters.
Their purpose is not clear, but writers have agreed that the effect
is to create joint and several liability only for those states that
actively participate in a launch."' Support for this argument is
extracted from the drafters' belief that it was necessary to include
explicitly in the category of participants in a joint launching a
15 Liability Convention, supra note 20.88 It should be noted that the Convention on Damage Caused by Foreign
Aircraft is not uniformly in force.
87 Foster, supra note 10, at 159.
Liability Convention, supra note 20, at art. V(c) (i).
11 Id. art. I(c) (ii).
90 1d. art. I(b).
" Foster, supra note 10, at 163.
82 Liability Convention, supra note 20, at art. V.
a Foster, supra note 10, at 165-66.
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state lending its territory or facility to the launch." Presumably
the state which merely procures the launching is to remain only
severally liable. The dividing line between active and passive par-
ticipation is non-existent. At what point a state which procures a
launching becomes sufficiently involved to be regarded as a joint
participant is not established. The word "procures" itself is subject
to innumerable interpretations."'
By virtue of joint and several liability the claimant state may
institute proceedings against any or all of the states responsible for
the full amount of the liability. The right of indemnification for
those states held in joint and several liability is also provided for
by Article V." Participants wishing to avoid ex post facto determi-
nation of their degree of liability may apportion responsibility
among themselves by agreement." Any such agreement, however,
shall not interfere with "the right of a state sustaining damage to
seek the entire compensation due under this Convention from any
or all of the launching states which are jointly and severally li-
able. 0
In a situation where two independent launchings result in an
accident with damage to a third party, the approach to joint and
several liability is the same." The claimant state is not required to
prove which launching state is in fact responsible for the damage.
Proceedings may be instituted against any of the launching states
for the full amount of the compensation.
Only a state, in the sense of a national government, may be
held liable under the Convention. Belief that participation in inter-
governmental organizations should not serve as a shield against
liability led to the drafting of Article XXII: "In this, Convention,
with the exception of articles XXIV to XXVII, references to States
9Paragraph 3 of Article V of the Liability Convention, supra note 20,
states, "A state from whose territory or facility a space object is launched shall
be regarded as a participant in a joint launching."
Interpretations of the meaning of the word "procure" might range from
producing the financial backing for a launch to inducing a state to launch a space
object in return for allowances for territory for military bases.
"Liability Convention, supra note 20, at art. V, para. 2. A launching state
which has paid compensation for damages shall have the right to present a claim
for indemnification to other participants in the joint launching.
97 Id.
" Liability Convention, supra note 20, at art. IV.
Id.
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shall be deemed to apply to any international intergovernmental
organization which conducts space activities if ... .""' There fol-
lows a list of three conditions that must be fulfilled before the
organization is held subject to the Convention: (1) a majority of
the members of the organization must be parties to the Outer
Space Treaty; (2) a majority must also be parties to the Conven-
tion; and (3) the organization must declare its acceptance of the
rights and obligations stipulated in the Convention.' The organi-
zation and those of its members that are parties to the Convention
are jointly and severally liable for resulting damage.' The Con-
vention indicates by silence that states not parties to the Con-
vention shall only be severally liable. The contention that mem-
bership in an organization subject to the Convention imputes
liability under the Convention to the member state has not been
considered.
There is a degree of protection from liability obtained by mem-
bership in an intergovernmental organization in that the claim
must first be presented to the organization." Only upon the
organization's failure to pay the compensation within the stipulated
time period do the member states that are parties to the Conven-
tion become jointly liable."' Although the organization may be
regarded as a defendant in the first instance, it does not have the
right to directly present a claim under the provisions of the Con-
"' Id. art. XXII. Articles XXIV and XXVII are inapplicable to organizations.
These articles are concerned with the signature, ratification, revision, amendment
and withdrawal from the Convention. Organizations are accorded no rights in
these matters.
101 Id.
102 Id. Article XXII states:
If an international intergovernmental organization is liable for
damage by virtue of the provisions of this Convention, that organi-
zation and those of its members which are States Parties to this
Convention shall be jointly and severally liable, provided however
that:
a) Any claim for compensation in respect of such damage shall
be first presented to the organization.
b) Only where the organization has not paid, within a period of
six months . . . , may the claimant state invoke the liability





vention, but must establish a claim through one of its member
states.'"
Individuals, companies, or other private entities cannot be held
liable under the Convention, as they are not discussed within the
context of the treaty. The Outer Space Treaty, however, provides
that "[s]tates parties to the Treaty shall bear international respon-
sibility for national activities in outer space, . . . whether such
activities are carried on by governmental agencies or by non-
governmental entities, . . ."" For states party to the Outer Space
Treaty, responsibility for space activities carried out by non-
governmental entities shall be imputed to the state. If states are
parties only to the Liability Convention, and not to the Outer
Space Treaty, the argument for imputation of responsibility is
weakened.
In most areas of international law the concept of imputability
imposes responsibility only for the acts of the agents and repre-
sentatives of a state."' Acts of government officials are thereby
distinguished from the acts of the individual citizens of a state.
On this basis the argument is advanced that "the Outer Space
Treaty in imposing responsibility on states for all national space
activities, whether governmental or non-governmental, must be
regarded as extending the concept of imputability [beyond the gen-
eral scope of international law] and as such binding only on those
states party to the Treaty.'.. If this is accepted, then the Conven-
tion does not provide for damage resulting from private launchings,
if any, in time, occur. The alternate argument may be made that
"the territorial criterion does not make a distinction between gov-
ernmental and private launchings from a state's territory or facility,
and both should, therefore, be regarded as covered by the Con-
vention."1" Further, the Outer Space Treaty served as a basis for
the general principles of liability in international space law. Argu-
ably, the principles first embodied by that treaty are now recog-
im By provisions of Articles Vm and IX only a state is granted the privilege
to present a claim for damages.
1 Outer Space Treaty, supra note 13, at art. IV.
107 Foster, supra note 10, at 164.
"I' Id. at 165.
109N. MATrE, supra note 32, at 35.
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nized as general principles of international space law binding on
all states whether or not the state is a party to the treaty.1
Ill. SEARCH AND RECOVERY OPERATIONS: FINANCIAL
RESPONSIBILITY AND TREATMENT OF THE WRECKAGE
A. Recovery of the Wreckage
The Liability Convention is concerned with compensation for
damage caused by a space object. As search and recovery costs
are not within the definition of "damage" as presented by the
Convention, the determination of the financial responsibility for
these operations is dependent on the terms of the Rescue Agree-
ment."' Although the purpose of the Rescue Agreement is basic-
ally humanitarian in nature,"' and primary importance is placed
on the provisions for return of astronauts, Article V of the Rescue
Agreement is concerned with the recovery and return of space
objects. Paragraph five of that article provides: "[Elxpenses in-
curred in fulfilling obligations to recover and return a space ob-
ject or its component parts under paragraphs 2 and 3 of this article
shall be borne by the launching authority. 11. Paragraphs two and
three authorize the state having jurisdiction over the territory
in which a space object is found to "take such steps as it finds
practicable to recover the object or component parts"'" and to
either return or hold such object(s) at the disposal of representa-
tives of the launching authority.11" Ownership of the space object,
however, remains with the launching state. Provisions in both
paragraphs provide that these actions are to be undertaken "upon
the request of the launching authority."''. This phrase gives rise
to the contingency that if search and recovery operations were
undertaken only on the initiative of the state in which they fell,
the launching authority would not be liable for expenses. If an
object were wrecked beyond repair, or of little intrinsic value, the
110 Foster, supra note 10, at 165.
111 Riccio, Astronauts and the Return of Objects Launched into Outer Space,
XII JAG L. REV. 142 (1970).
112Id.
113 Rescue Agreement, supra note 17, at art. 5.
114Id. art. 5, para. 2.
115 Id. art. 5, para. 2.
116 Id. art. 5, paras. 2, 3.
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launching authority presumably would not wish to expend the
money to recover the object. In that case, if a state recovers the
debris for its own purposes, for example in the hope of gaining
information, the launching authority should not have to bear the
cost of that recovery.
The Rescue Agreement recognizes the possibility that a space
object, or its component parts may be of a hazardous or deleterious
nature. In such a case, paragraph four overrides paragraphs two
and three of Article V of the Rescue Agreement and establishes
an affirmative duty for the launching authority to "immediately
take effective steps, under the direction and control of [the state
having jurisdiction over the territory in which the object is found],
to eliminate possible danger of harm.".. If paragraph four is in-
yoked, the launching authority could argue that its responsibility
is limited to the expenses which it incurs. Paragraph five requires
only "expenses incurred in fulfilling obligations . . . under para-
graphs 2 and 3" to be borne by the launching authority."'
The phrase "launching authority" is used in the Rescue Agree-
ment as opposed to "launching state" in the Liability Convention.
For purposes of the Rescue Agreement, "launching authority"
means the state responsible for the launching."" International inter-
governmental organizations are included within that meaning. ' 0
Although the phrase is not as clearly defined in the Rescue Agree-
ment as in the Liability Convention, conceptual differences are
not created by the use of the term "authority" instead of "state,"
and the two phrases should be equated.
The Liability Convention does make provision for the possi-
bility that falling space objects may cause "large scale danger to
human life or seriously interfere with the living conditions of the
population."' This provision does not establish a duty for the
launching state immediately to "take steps to eliminate the possible
danger and harm," but only requires the launching state to "exam-
" Id. art. 5, para. 4.
18 Id. art. 5, para. 5.
u9 Id. art. 6.
120 Id. The international intergovernmental organization must declare its
acceptance of the rights and obligations provided for in the Rescue Agreement
and a majority of the states members of that organization must be contracting
parties to the Rescue Agreement and to the Outer Space Treaty.
121 Liability Convention, supra note 20, at art. XXI.
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ine the possibility" of lending assistance to the state which has
suffered the damage." Under the article, other states which are
parties to the Convention are also compelled to examine the possi-
bility of rendering aid in the event of widespread danger."' An
allocation of financial responsibility, should any state actually
render aid, is not made.
B. Return of the Space Object or Component Parts
Upon recovery, the space object, or any debris, is to be returned
to the launching authority at the request of that state. If requested
by the state which recovers any object or its parts, identifying
data must be furnished by the launching authority prior to the
return."' The basis for this requirement is Article VIII of the
Outer Space Treaty, which states: "[O]bjects that are launched
into outer space or component parts found beyond the limits of
the State Party to the Treaty on whose registry they are carried
shall be returned to the State Party, which shall, upon request,
furnish identifying data prior to their return..... Article VIII also
provides that ownership of space objects is not affected by their
presence in outer space or their return to earth, and jurisdiction
and control of the object while in outer space remains with the
"State Party to the Treaty on whose registry an object is launched
into outer space .... "
Protective provisions as to the treatment of a space object be-
fore its return to the state of ownership are not present in the
treaties governing international space law. The treaties neither
authorize nor prohibit an examination of the space object by the
scientists of the country in which it landed. Clearly, an examination
to determine the potential danger of any object would not be
questioned. A launching state, however, might protest if the pur-
pose of the scrutiny were the discovery of technological data.
C. Identification of the Space Object or Component Parts
Identification of the wreckage of space objects has, to date, not
been of great concern. All objects launched into space are tracked
In Id.
12 Id.
124 Rescue Agreement, supra note 17.
'is Outer Space Treaty, supra note 13, at art. VIII.
12, Id.
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by the North American Air Defense Center, located near Colorado
Springs, Colorado."' Increased space traffic, however, has made the
continuous tracking of every object impossible.' 8 Concern over this
problem led to the drafting of the Convention on the Registration
of Objects Launched into Outer Space in 1975 to provide for the
central registration of all objects launched into space. A marking
system that would survive reentry into the atmosphere was not
included in the requirements of the Registration Convention, due
to technical impracticability."" The importance of the Registra-
tion Convention in regard to the imputation of liability for dam-
age may be somewhat lessened by this omission. At present, low-
orbital objects, with limited lifespans in space, are reportedly moni-
tored continuously." Theoretically, when one reenters the atmos-
phere, identification is possible. As to the exact nature of the
object, the Registration Convention requires only that the "gen-
eral function of the object be noted in the registry."' 3'
IV. CLAIMS PROCEDURE UNDER THE LIABILITY CONVENTION
The Liability Convention only allows states to bring a claim
for compensation.' By virtue of Article VIII a state may present
a claim for damage to: (a) its territory, property or nationals
(whether they may be natural or juridical persons); (b) foreign
nationals where they sustain damage in its territory provided that
their state of nationality has not presented a claim; and (c) foreign
nationals permanently resident in its territory provided that their
state of nationality and the state in whose territory such foreign
nationals suffered the damage have not presented claims or clari-
227NEWSWEEK, Feb. 6, 1968, at 14.
228 Id.
'EN. MATTE, supra note 32, at 182.
See note 123 supra.
"' Convention on the Registration of Objects Launched into Outer Space
(1976), 28 U.S.T. 695.
'u Liability Convention, supra note 20, at art. VIII. To bring a claim under
the Liability Convention it is not necessary for a claimant state to have first
exhausted the remedies available in the forum of the launching state. Nor does
the Convention preclude a claimant state "from pursuing a claim in the courts or
administrative tribunals or agencies of the launching state." A claim may not,
however, be brought under the Convention if it is concurrently being pursued in
the tribunals of the launching state. Id.
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fled their intention of presenting claims.3 ' By this provision indi-
viduals have the right to compensation through various states,
notwithstanding that their state of nationality may be unprepared
to submit a claim on their behalf in the event that the damage
occurred outside of the state of nationality of the individual vic-
tim.' Article VIII also provides a system to avoid a multiplicity
of claims." The state in which the damage occurs may present
the claims of all who sustain damage provided that the govern-
ments of foreign nationals involved confer this right on the claim-
ant state either expressly or impliedly, as by inaction.'" A prob-
lem exists since no time limit is set in which a state, either the
state of nationality or the state where the damage occurred, must
clarify an intention to present a claim. The state that wishes to
make a claim on behalf of foreign nationals is thus left in an un-
certain position.
Any claim for damage must be submitted to the launching
state within one year following either the date of the occurrence
of the damage or the identification of the launching state which is
liable.1"' An exception to the time limit exists where the claimant
state is unable to identify the launching state or is unaware that
any damage has occurred.1"' The one-year period is to commence
when these facts are learned."' The limitation period is never to
"exceed one year following the date on which the State could
reasonably be expected to have learned of the facts through the
exercise of due diligence."'' The exception does not apply to
133 Id.
"4The principles of liability of international space law do not apply to
domestic claims. Thus, if a United States space object, such as Skylab, crashes
to earth on United States soil, the victims of any damage could not recover
from the government under the Liability Convention. The injured party would
be limited to actions against the government under the Federal Tort Claims
Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2674 (1976), or against the launching authority. At this time
the launching authority would be either NASA or a branch of the military.
Claims against NASA are brought under the NASA Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2473-13(A)
(1976) and against the military under the Military Claims Act, 10 U.S.C. 5
2733 (1976).
11 Liability Convention, supra note 20, at art. VIII.
1 Id.
'
3 7 1d. art. X(1).




cases in which the claimant has knowledge of the damage but not
of its extent. Claims may be revised, however, until "one year after
the full extent of the damage is known."'"
"A claim for compensation for damage shall be presented to a
launching state through diplomatic channels," as provided by
Article IX. " If the states involved do not maintain diplomatic
relations the claimant state may request another state to present
its claim.'0 If both the claimant and launching states are members
of the United Nations, the claim may be presented through the
Secretary General of the United Nations. '"
An alternative claim procedure is established and detailed in
Articles XIV through XX of the Liability Convention to pro-
vide for the possibility that diplomatic negotiations will not re-
sult in a settlement within one year of the submission of the
claim.1  Either party may request that a Claims Commission be
established to dispose of the matter." The Claims Commission is
to be composed of three members: one appointed by the claimant
state(s); one appointed by the launching state(s); and the third
member, the Chairman, to be appointed jointly by the parties. "
If no agreement can be reached as to the choice of a Chairman
within four months, that post shall be appointed by the Secre-
tary General of the United Nations, at the request of one of the
parties, within the succeeding two months.1" The Chairman is to
act as a single member of the Claims Commission if one party fails
to appoint its member of the Claims Commission."
The Commission "shall decide the merits of the claim to deter-
mine the amount of compensation to be paid, if any."'50 As stated
above, the decision of the Claims Commission will be made accord-
ing to principles of international law, justice and equity." An
141 Id. art. X(3).
'4 Id. art. IX.
143 Id.
144 Id.
'" Id. arts. XIV-XX.
'4 Id. art. XIV.
1
4 7 Id. art. XV.
1 Id. art. XV(2).
19Id. art. XVI(i).
50 "Id. art. XVIII.
151 d. arts. XIX(1), XII.
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inherent weakness in this method of settlement is that the deci-
sion of the Claims Commission shall be final and binding only if
the parties so agree."" "Otherwise the Commission shall render
a final and recommendatory award which the parties shall con-
sider in good faith."" Without a provision for compulsory pro-
cedures in which the decision reached is to be final and binding
on the parties, not subject to appeal, and to be executed without
delay, the Liability Convention may not truly accomplish one of
its main purposes as recited in the preamble. That goal is to
"ensure the prompt payment under the terms of this Convention
of a full and equitable measure of compensation to victims of
such damage," indicating victims of damage caused by space
objects.1"'
VI. CONCLUSION
Scholars in the field of international law, through reference to
general international legal principles and analogy to existing inter-
national agreements concerning other types of activity, anticipated
the adoption of many of the major principles now embodied in
the international agreements concerning activities in space."' The
provisions of the treaties formulated by the Legal Subcommittee
of the United Nations Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer
Space, therefore, generally set forth principles of international space
law that have been previously recognized. There are, however, cer-
tain deficiencies in the international law governing space activities
as defined by those treaties.
One problem is the lack of a single comprehensive treaty.
Major legal aspects such as the financial responsibility for search
and recovery operations and the treatment of wreckage are cov-
ered in the Rescue Agreement but are not dealt with by the pro-
12 Id. art. XIX(2).
Id.
" Liability Convention, supra note 20, at Preamble.
155 For example, the application of the principle of absolute liability for dam-
age caused by space activities was supported prior to the adoption of that principle
in the 1972 Liability Convention. See S. LAY & H. TAUBENFELD, THE LAw
RELATING TO THE ACTIVITIES OF MAN IN SPACE 169-71 (1970); M. McDOUGAL,
H. LASWELL & I. VLASIC, LAW AND PUBLIC ORDER IN SPACE 165 (1963). The
possibility that certain limitations would be placed on the imposition of absolute
liability was recognized. Id.
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visions of the Liability Convention. A state does not necessarily
join in acceptance of every treaty, and may choose not to recog-
nize principles enunciated in a treaty to which that state is not a
party.
There are deficiencies in the Liability Convention of 1972,
which governs the majority of legal problems possible in the event
of the fall of a space object. Primarily, the Liability Convention
suffers from a lack of specificity, as, for example, in the failure to
adequately define the term "space object,"'" or in the failure to
clarify the time limit within which a state must indicate its intention
to present a claim under the Convention."' Objections were made
at the time of the drafting of the Liability Convention that the de-
cisions of the Claims Commission provided for in Article XIX
would not be binding upon the parties involved."' Arguments were
made that if the decisions of the Claims Commission were to be
binding, states involved would be induced to negotiate a settlement
prior to the establishment of the Claims Commission, and injured
parties would be assured of a final settlement to their claim to
which the state or states responsible would be bound."'
It is obvious that the work of the Legal Subcommittee is far
from complete. The Skylab event was not an isolated occurrence.
Since the advent of the "Space Age" in 1957, more than 10,000
objects have been launched into orbit.' Six thousand have fallen
back to earth; although most are consumed upon reentry into the
earth's atmosphere, it has been estimated that as many as three
objects per week survive to impact with the earth."' Thus the legal
problems discussed here are not concerns merely for academic
speculation, but rather dilemmas of the utmost practical im-
portance.
"' See text accompanying notes 73-87 supra.
57 See text accompanying notes 132-141 supra.
"'See 21 U.N. GAOR, Committees (1st) (Agenda Item 33), U.N. Docs.
A/C.1/PV.1819-A/C.1/PV.1826 (1971).
159 Id.
160 U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT, supra note 4.
161 Id.
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